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Abstract
The paper explores various measures of institutional quality in Russian regions, and 
compares those measures to each other. Such analysis leads to the conclusion that  Russian 
regional institutions are essentially multidimensional, and therefore comparisons of 
Russian regions in terms of their overall institutional quality could be problematic. New 
institutional indices are derived from Russian enterprise surveys held under the BEEPS 
project of the  European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. Such indices yield 
DW\SRORJ\RI5XVVLDQUHJLRQVLQWHUPVRIHI¿FDF\RIUHJLRQDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQV¶FRQWURORYHU
economy and bureaucracy in their regions. Dynamics of regional institutional  indices is 
investigated against the backdrop of Russia-wide institutional trends. 
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1. Introduction
Successes and failures in economic development are associated with institu-
WLRQV²³UXOHVRI WKHJDPH´ LQ WKHHFRQRP\DQGVRFLHW\ZKLFKFUHDWHPRUHRI
less favorable environments for economic activity. Effective institutions support 
entrepreneurship, attract investments, and promote economic growth. In contrast, 
stagnation and poverty, even when resources are abundant, are usually associated 
ZLWKÀDZVLQWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQW
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Once it is realized how important institutions are for economic develop-
ment, it is natural to make an attempt to measure institutional quality. Interest 
in such measures occurs for at least three reasons. First, entrepreneurs and in-
vestors who choose countries and regions for their operations need assessments 
of the investment climate in prospective jurisdictions. Second, these indicators 
are useful in assessments of the performance of government agencies by vot-
ers, higher  authorities (in the case of regions), and by international organizations, 
ZKLFKRIWHQFRQGLWLRQDVVLVWDQFHORDQVRUPHPEHUVKLSLQGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV¶
groups on the quality of national institutions. Measurable improvement of insti-
WXWLRQVUHÀHFWHGE\LQWHUQDWLRQDOUDWLQJVFRXOGEHLQFOXGHGLQSROLWLFDOSODWIRUPV
and campaign promises, as recently happened in Russia. Finally, analysts need 
these ratings to forecast the development of national and regional economies, to 
LGHQWLI\WKHLUFRPSHWLWLYHDGYDQWDJHVDQG³ERWWOHQHFNV´DQGWRHYDOXDWHWKHHIIHFW
of various factors (e.g., history, geography, public policy, social structure, norms, 
and values) on the quality of institutions.
Of course, the measurement of institutions and their contribution to economic 
RXWFRPHVPXVW EHSUHFHGHGE\ D FOHDU GH¿QLWLRQRI WKHLQVWLWXWLRQV7KHUH DUH
different points of view in the literature as to what can and cannot be consi dered 
LQVWLWXWLRQV 7KHFRPPRQ GH¿QLWLRQ RI LQVWLWXWLRQV E\ ' 1RUWK DV PDQPDGH
³UXOHVRIWKHJDPH´LQWKHHFRQRP\DQGVRFLHW\DGPLWVYDULRXVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQV,Q
particular, there are formal and informal institutions; in addition, institutions are 
contrasted with organizations, however subtle the differences between the two 
could be. Both statutory regulations and their implementation and enforcement 
practices can be considered institutions. Long-term institutions are contrasted 
with shorter-term policies emphasizing the role of institutions as constraints on 
choices made by governments and private sector agents. A hierarchy can be es-
tablished among institutions; basic institutions (such as constitutional provisions) 
shape the framework of economic activity, including dispute resolution, property 
DQGFRQWUDFWULJKWVFRPSHWLWLRQHWF9DULRXVSDUWVRIVXFKDIUDPHZRUNLQWKHLU
turn, could also be considered institutions. Disagreements in the literature about 
the extent to which institutions affect economic and social outcomes are largely 
due to different interpretations of the very concept of institution.
$VGH¿QLWLRQVRILQVWLWXWLRQVGLIIHUVRGRDSSURDFKHVWRLQVWLWXWLRQDOPHDVXUH-
ment. Measures of institutions can be formal; in this case, they record presence 
RUDEVHQFHRIFHUWDLQUHJXODWRU\DXWKRULWLHVOHJLVODWLRQRI¿FLDOO\SUHVFULEHGSUR-
FHGXUHVDQGVRIRUWK$QRWKHUSRVVLELOLW\LVWRXVHVXEVWDQWLYHLQGLFHVUHÀHFWLQJ
WKHRSLQLRQVH[SHULHQFHVDQGDSSUDLVDOVRILQVWLWXWLRQV¶XVHUVIRUH[DPSOHHQWUH-
preneurs, managers, and citizens) and external experts who are able to compare 
WKHTXDOLW\RILQVWLWXWLRQVLQGLIIHUHQWMXULVGLFWLRQV9RLJW)LQDOO\LQVWLWX-
tions can be gauged by indirect indicators that are observable and measurable and 
expected to be correlated with the institutions of interest. Presently, there many 
dozens of institutional quality measures produced by rating agencies, think tanks, 
international organi zations and research groups. Although these measures are 
susceptible to criticism (see  Langbein and Knack, 2010; Thomas, 2010; Glaeser 
et al., 2004), they are widely used in academic literature, applied analyses, and 
for other purposes. 
9DULRXV PHDVXUHV DUH DYDLODEOH IRU 5XVVLDQ LQVWLWXWLRQV LQFOXGLQJ HJ
the protection of property rights, rule of law, business climate, and government 
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accountability and effectiveness. However, it is well-known that the institution-
al environ ment in Russia is highly uneven across its vast territory, and Russian 
UHJLRQV H[KLELW VLJQL¿FDQW GLIIHUHQFHV LQ LQYHVWPHQW DWWUDFWLYHQHVV EXVLQHVV
 climate, and regional government effectiveness. Nation-wide institutional mea-
VXUHVGRQRW UHÀHFW DQG LQ IDFW KLGH VXFKYDULDWLRQV 6Q\GHU  WRKDYH
a better idea of the actual conditions on the ground, one needs institutional mea-
sures for particular regions. 
Indices and ratings of Russian regional institutions have been produced over 
the last 10–15 years. Although they are not as varied and numerous as country-
level indices of institutional quality, their number has exceeded a few dozen. 
,WLVQRWHDV\IRUSRWHQWLDO³FRQVXPHUV´WRQDYLJDWHWKLVYDULHW\WKHUHIRUHWKHUH
is a need for an analysis of available indices and for an assessment of their 
suit ability for academic and practical purposes. This problem has not received 
proper attention in the litera ture (one of the few such studies is by Libman and 
.R]ORY7KHSUHVHQWSDSHULVLQWHQGHGWRSDUWLDOO\¿OOWKLVJDS
2XU¿UVWRUGHURIEXVLQHVVLVWRDQDO\]HWKHOLQNVEHWZHHQLQGLFDWRUVRIWKHUH-
gional institutions and, in particular, to determine to what extent these indica-
WRUVDUHFRUUHODWHGZLWKRQHDQRWKHU,QWKHFDVHRIKLJKO\VWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQW
corre lations of most indicators with one another, one can rank regions in terms 
of their overall institutional performance. Conversely, a weak correlation be-
WZHHQLQGLYLGXDOLQGLFHVVXSSRUWVD³PXOWLGLPHQVLRQDO´YLHZRIUHJLRQDOLQVWL-
tutions. In this case, it would be problematic to derive composite institutional 
indices by aggregating partial indicators such as rule of law, competitiveness of 
the regional economy, corruption prevention, etc. It should be borne in mind that 
WKHDERYH LQVWLWXWLRQDO FDWHJRULHV DUH WKHPVHOYHV JHQHUDOL]HG FRQFHSWV ³FRQ-
VWUXFWV´DQGWKHDELOLW\WRPHDVXUHWKHPLVQRWREYLRXVDSULRULDQGPXVWDOVR
EHFRQ¿UPHGHPSLULFDOO\XVLQJYDULRXVVSHFL¿FLQGLFHV
In this paper, we consider as regional institutions various aspects and compo-
nents of the actual regional environment for economic activities. As noted above, 
WKLVH[WHQGHGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQFRQWUDGLFWV WKH³QDUURZ´RQHZKLFK LVFRPPRQLQ
WKHOLWHUDWXUHDQGGH¿QHVLQVWLWXWLRQVDVORQJWHUPFRQVWUDLQWVRQHFRQRPLFDG-
ministrative, and political decision-making. We base our interpretation on the fact 
WKDW LQVWLWXWLRQV³GH IDFWR´ UDWKHU WKDQ³GH MXUH´DUH UHOHYDQW IRUGHYHORSPHQW
IXUWKHUPRUHRFFDVLRQDOO\WKHUHLVQRVLJQL¿FDQWDQGUREXVWUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
de jure and de facto institutions. Cross-country studies show that formal legal 
provisions, including constitutional norms such as checks and balances, do not 
themselves systematically affect economic outcomes; the mere existence of these 
norms does not guarantee their enforcement (Glaeser et al., 2004). When govern-
ments are not properly accountable, bureaucrats and/or interest groups easily 
sidestep, if needed, statutory requirements or manipulate and misinterpret them 
(Acemoglu et al., 2008).
Implementation practices could be of greater immediate relevance for doing 
business than the formal rules proper. This is particularly likely in Russia, where 
lax and arbitrary implementation proverbially compensates for excessive tight-
ness and rigidity of statutory requirements. Furthermore, legislation and other 
institutions in Russia are commonly misused (for more details see Polishchuk, 
2008), which further widens the gap between formal institutions and the actual 
conditions on the ground. 
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,QRXUDQDO\VLVZHSUHVHUYHWKHGH¿QLQJ³PDQPDGH´FKDUDFWHULVWLFRILQVWLWX
tions, which emphasizes their dependence on government actions and policies, 
and on prevailing conventions and behavioral practices. Hence, institutions are 
contrasted with exogenous factors of regional development such as geography , 
resource abundance, historically shaped structure of the regional economy, and 
socio-cultural characteristics and ethnic mix of the population. Sometimes it is dif-
¿FXOWWRVHSDUDWH³PDQPDGH´LQVWLWXWLRQVIURPH[RJHQRXVIDFWRUVEHFDXVHKLVWRU\
and geography are powerful institutional determinants (technically speaking , they 
VHUYHDV³LQVWUXPHQWDOYDULDEOHV´IRULQVWLWXWLRQV6RNRORIIDQG(QJHUPDQ
 Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002). In turn, institutions affect other factors that are es-
sential for regional development, such as norms and values of the population and 
human capital accumulation (Tabellini, 2008b).
,WFRXOGEHTXLWHGLI¿FXOWWRSURSHUO\JUDVSWKLVFRPSOH[ZHERIFDXVHHIIHFW
relationships. However, cross-regional analyses within the boundaries of a single 
country could simplify such a task in comparison to cross-country comparative 
institutional studies, which are prevalent in the literature (Snyder, 2001). Russian 
regions are subject to the same federal laws, they are parts of the Russia-wide 
market, share a common history, and have similar politics, socio-cultural char-
acteristics and other factors and features that affect relationships between insti-
tutions and economic outcomes. With such commonality, one can have greater 
FRQ¿GHQFH LQ VWDWLVWLFDOPRGHOVGHVFULELQJ LQVWLWXWLRQDO FDXVDOLWLHV5HJLRQVRI
WKHVDPHFRXQWU\PRUH OLNHO\VDWLVI\ WKH³FHWHULVSDULEXV´ UHTXLUHPHQW WKDQGR
different and often disparate countries of the world, and cross-regional analyses 
DUHOHVVOLNHO\WREHGLVWRUWHGE\WKH³RPLWWHGYDULDEOHV´ELDV
In the next section of this paper, we analyze the main approaches to the mea-
surement of institutions presented in the literature, mostly at the cross-country 
level, to draw lessons and recommendations for institutional measurement in 
Russian regions. We then proceed to a discussion of how Russian regional institu-
tions evolved from the outset of market reforms until the present; we are particu-
larly interested in the causes of institutional diversity between regions observed 
under the conditions of economic and political decentralization in the 1990s, and 
VXVWDLQHGLQWKHIROORZLQJGHFDGHRIWKH³SRZHUYHUWLFDO´
In the empirical part of the paper, we review various sources of data, including 
regional ratings and rankings, which are available for institutional measurement. 
To understand better what exactly such ratings measure and whether they can be 
used jointly or separately, we analyze how such measures relate to one another. 
We propose new indices of regional institutions making use of the recent Russian 
enterprise surveys, which leads to a taxonomy of regional institutional regimes. 
Next, we discuss regional institutional dynamics against the backdrop of institu-
tional trends nationwide and argue that a decline of the quality of national insti-
tutions was concurrent with a divergence of regional institutional regimes. We 
conclude with a discussion of causes and consequences of institutional diversity 
among Russian regions. 
2. Measurement of Institutions: Methodology and Dilemmas
The history of institutional measurement began in investment ratings produced 
by international consultancies for potential investors. These ratings characterized 
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the prospects of doing business in various countries. When economists turned to 
measuring institutions, they encountered a number of serious methodological and 
practical problems.
Measurement of institutions cannot be separated from the ongoing debates on 
the role of institutions in economic development. The main problem is to properly 
separate institutions from economic outcomes and not consider the latter when 
measuring institutions lest the link between institutions and development become 
tautological. The above-mentioned formal procedural approach fully meets this 
requirement but is not very helpful otherwise because the mere presence of for-
mal rules is not systematically related to the outcomes. 
This certainly does not imply that constitutional and other long-term formal 
FRQVWUDLQWV RQ SROLWLFDO DQG HFRQRPLF DFWRUV DUH RI QR SUDFWLFDO VLJQL¿FDQFH
Rather, such rules, when they are enacted formally but have no historical and 
cultural roots and no robust enforcement mechanisms, can be violated with impu-
nity. In particular, it is well-known that simple copycat replication by developing 
countries of the institutions of developed market democracies rarely brings about 
the expected result (Weingast, 1997) because such constitutional provisions often 
die on the vine.1 Thus, what matter are not the formal provisions per se, but rather 
their enforcement practices, which renders the formal approach to institutional 
measurement largely impractical. 
The most common alternative is to use subjective opinions and judgments 
E\H[SHUWVDQGRUXVHUVRILQVWLWXWLRQV,QWKLVFDVHRQHVKRXOGH[SHFW³QRLV\´
results; the question is, to what extent are these noises random and uncorrelated 
with one another (if they are, one could hope to reduce noise by aggregating 
survey results or using opinions of different experts, for example), or do they 
UHÀHFW V\VWHPLF GLVWRUWLRQVZKLFK FDQQRW EH HOLPLQDWHG E\ DJJUHJDWLRQ 6XFK
GLVWRUWLRQV FDQ EH GXH WR WKH³KDOR HIIHFW´ %DUGKDQ ZKHQ MXGJPHQWV
about an institution are actually inferred from social and economic conditions 
on the ground. Experts gladly award high marks to institutions in economically 
successful countries , and do not hesitate to award low scores to institutions of 
poor, stagnant and politically unstable nations. 
6XFKDQDSSURDFKLVMXVWL¿HGLQDVPXFKLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHDEVWUDFWFDWHJRULHVWKDW
cannot be directly observed; therefore, it is natural to use for their assessment ob-
servable characteristics, which are expected to be linked to the underlying institu-
tions. It is clear, however, that any statistical inferences obtained by using observ-
able outcomes as institutional measures would be suspected of reverse causality. 
To mitigate such risks, modern methods of institutional measurement are 
EDVHGRQFURVVFRXQWU\FRPSDULVRQVRI³VWDQGDUGVLWXDWLRQV´([DPSOHVRIVXFK
situations include common administrative procedures (e.g., opening a business, 
access to utilities, and issuance of permits and licenses (Djankov et al., 2002)), 
settlements of comparable commercial disputes (World Bank, 2014), and fre-
quency of the occurrence of certain institutional pathologies (property expropria-
tion or raider attacks on business). Experts, business consultants, managers and 
entrepreneurs are requested to assess, e.g., competition, corruption, independence 
of courts, and effectiveness and competency of the bureaucracy. It is hoped that 
 1 This can be illustrated by, e.g., the absence of a clearly expressed link between the quality of monetary 
policy and the presence of a law on central bank independence (Acemoglu et al., 2008). 
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WKHXVHRI VSHFL¿FTXHVWLRQV DQGXQL¿HGPHDVXUHPHQW WHFKQLTXHV UHGXFHVGLV-
tortions, and aggregation of institutional measurements obtained from various 
sources would further improve the precision of measurement and make it less 
subjective. 
Such principles are implemented in the best known and most widely used 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOPHDVXUHPHQWSURMHFW³*RYHUQDQFH0DWWHUV´.DXIPDQHWDO
The project takes stock of numerous institutional measures produced over the last 
decades and aggregates those into clusters that correspond to various aspects 
( dimensions) of the institutional environment. Authors of the project demar-
cate six main clusters: voice and accountability, political stability and absence 
of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and con-
trol of corruption. All data sources used to construct those measures are based 
on perceptions of institutions by respondents. To defend such a methodology, 
the  authors argue that economic decisions, which are most likely to affect eco-
nomic performance, are largely based on such perceptions; hence, institutional 
measures derived in this manner will likely be suitable to describe the effect of 
institutions on economic outcomes. 
Aggregate indices of institutional quality mentioned above are widely used 
in economic studies, both explaining cross-country variations of institutional 
quality and using institutions to explain economic outcomes. These indicators 
are also widely used in various international programs and projects (Thomas, 
$WWKHVDPHWLPH³*RYHUQDQFH0DWWHUV´LQGLFDWRUVDUHVXEMHFWWRFULWL-
cism that calls into question both the measurement methodology and the very 
GH¿QLWLRQRIWKHPHDVXUHPHQWREMHFWV7KHVL[FOXVWHUVDUHDEVWUDFWFDWHJRULHV
³FRQVWUXFWV´ WKDW DJJUHJDWH VRPHWLPHVGLVSDUDWHSKHQRPHQDDQGDVSHFWVRI
economic activity. For example, the notion of corruption incorporates low-level 
bureaucratic corruption, high-level corruption, political corruption, govern ment 
capture, patronage etc. Different corruption measures, including those based on 
corruption perception or on corruption experience, do not agree with one an-
other and are explained by various sets of factors (Treisman, 2007).
9DJXHGH¿QLWLRQVRIFRUUXSWLRQDQGRWKHULQVWLWXWLRQDOFOXVWHUVPDNHLWGLI¿FXOW
WRDVVLJQYDULRXVVSHFL¿FPHDVXUHVWRVXFKFOXVWHUV7KLVSURYLGHVDQH[WUDUHDVRQ
WR GRXEW WKHDSSOLFDELOLW\ RI WKH³*RYHUQDQFH0DWWHUV´ DJJUHJDWH LQGLFHV LW LV
arguably unclear whether there is indeed a real-life object that is measured, rather 
WKDQDQDUWL¿FLDOFRQFHSW7KRPDV
,QVWLWXWLRQDO LQGLFDWRUV RI WKH³*RYHUQDQFH0DWWHUV´ SURMHFW DUH KLJKO\ FRU-
related with one another (their pairwise correlations range from 0.6 to 0.9 and 
higher), and factor analysis yields a principal component explaining over 60% of 
the total variation of all indices (Langbein and Knack, 2010). This could be inter-
preted as evidence of close connectedness of various institutions to one another, 
in which case one could make judgements about the overall quality of national 
institutions (Tabellini , 2008a) by using, e.g., the above-mentioned principal com-
ponent as an aggregate institutional performance index. 
Such a high degree of agreement between different measures can be expected 
when govern ment and/or society have broad discretion over institutional choices 
and use it in the interests of society which requires commensurate progress along 
all of the institutional axes (in other words, various institutions are complements 
rather than substitutes so that, e.g., political stability cannot make up for high 
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FRUUXSWLRQ7KLV OLNHO\ RYHUVWDWHV DQG RYHUVLPSOL¿HV WKHUHDOLWLHV RI LQVWLWXWLRQ
making and contra dicts the observed variability of institutions and their bundles 
across the world. An alternative explanation, corroborated by in-depth analysis of 
OLQNDJHVEHWZHHQLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQGLFHVRIWKH³*RYHUQDQFH0DWWHUV´SURMHFWLVWKDW
the high correlations between these indices are due to the employed methodology 
DQG UHÀHFW HLWKHU FRPPRQPHDVXUHPHQW HUURUV HJ WKHKDOR HIIHFW RU YDJXH
GH¿QLWLRQVRIZKDWLVPHDVXUHG
Different institutions play different roles in economic development, which is 
another indication that institutions are inherently multi-dimensional, should not 
be aggregated in a single measure of institutional quality, and could not be de-
rived from one such measure. In particular, property rights protection is one of 
the fundamental factors of sustainable economic development, while the effect 
of contract enforcement on development is not as evident, although it strongly 
DIIHFWVEXVLQHVVDFWLYLW\DQG¿QDQFLDOV\VWHPV$FHPRJOXDQG-RKQVRQ
Furthermore, property rights and contract enforcement have different historical 
roots, which is another argument for separate rather than aggregate analysis of 
institutional measures. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the economic suc-
cess of countries such as China, with weak democratic accountability, absence 
of checks and balances, and unconventional protection of property rights, which 
receive low scores in some international rankings (Qian, 2003; Glaeser et al., 
2004).
Another reason why institutions cannot be measured by a single aggregate 
indicator (or group of closely connected separate measures) is that the effect 
of a particular institution on economic outcomes depends on other characteris-
tics of the institutional environment (Aoki, 2007). Due to complementarity of 
various institutions, similar reforms (such as liberalization, privatization, etc.) 
could lead to diverse outcomes depending on the institutional backdrop (see, e.g., 
Polishchuk , 2013; Dower et al., 2014). Obviously, such effects can be analyzed 
only with multiple institutional measures at hand. 
Of particular interest are indirect institutional measures that can be derived 
from observable economic outcomes. It was noted earlier in the paper that a se-
rious shortcoming of this approach is potential reverse causality. Nevertheless, 
VXFKDPHDVXUHPHQW WHFKQLTXHFRXOGEH MXVWL¿DEOHZKHQHFRQRPLF LQGLFDWRUV
FDQVHUYHDV³OLWPXVWHVWV´IRULQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\$QH[DPSOHRIVXFKDQLQGL-
cator is the share of informal economy (in the GDP, employment, etc.). Usually, 
the informal sector offers inferior conditions for doing business by restricting 
DFFHVVWR¿QDQFHSODFLQJD³JODVVFHLOLQJ´RQ¿UPV¶JURZWKDQGGHQ\LQJOHJDO
protection to shadow businesses, etc. These extra costs of doing business infor-
PDOO\VXJJHVWWKDW¿UPVDUHIRUFHGWRH[LWLQWRWKHLQIRUPDOVHFWRUWRDYRLGHYHQ
JUHDWHUORVVHVIURPVWD\LQJLQWKHRI¿FLDOHFRQRP\DQGVXIIHULQJIURPUHGWDSH
predatory taxation and other institutional pathologies. The share of informal em-
ployment is thus strongly correlated with other measures of institutional quality 
(Djankov et al., 2002) and could thus itself serve as such a measure. 
Institutional performance measures are being produced not only for nations of 
the world but also for regions of a given country; presently, such measures are 
available inter alia for subnational units of the US, China, India, Italy, Germany, 
Poland and other European countries. Measurement of regional institutions is not 
as active as of the national ones. However, the same methods and approaches 
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usually are applied in both cases (see for example Knack, 2002; Hall and Sobell, 
2008; Tabellini, 2008a; Calì et al., 2011; Giordano and Tommasino, 2011; Xu, 
2011), particularly because national and regional indicators are often produced 
by the same organizations (Karabegovich and McMahon, 2006). 
The two decades-long experience of measuring institutions in various coun-
tries and regions of the world demonstrates that institutions are fundamentally 
diverse, that their effect on economic and social outcomes is as a rule multi-
faceted and that such measurement calls for a range of different methods and 
data sources. Another lesson is that a structure found in the institutional diversity 
should not always be imposed a priori; it might be better to obtain such structure 
endogenously, deriving it from the available data (e.g., by using factor analysis), 
and subsequently seek proper interpretation for the obtained measures that are 
grounded in data rather than hypothesized in advance. 
3. Institutions in Russian Regions
,W LVZHOO NQRZQ WKDW5XVVLDQ UHJLRQV VLJQL¿FDQWO\ GLIIHU IURPRQH DQRWKHU
in their investment attractiveness and business environment (Zubarevich, 2010).
The interregional variations in the intensity of red tape, access to infrastructure 
and markets, costs and risks of doing business that are observed in Russia (Shchet-
inin et al., 2005; World Bank, 2014) are rarely observed within a single country. 
7KHVHYDULDWLRQVDUHUHÀHFWHGLQGRPHVWLFDQGSDUWLFXODUO\LQIRUHLJQLQYHVWPHQWV
in regional economies, sizes of informal sectors in the regions (Syunyaev and 
Polishchuk, 2014), and other key indicators.
Interregional institutional diversity is inevitable for a country as vast and diverse 
as Russia, with uneven distribution of resources, population, and economic activity. 
It is known from the literature that geography and natural environment shape insti-
tutions and thus could be causes of institutional diversity (Sokoloff and Engerman , 
2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). History also plays a role (Acemoglu et al., 
2001), and indeed, the institutional diversity between Russian regions has deep his-
torical roots (see, e.g., Dower and Markevich, 2014; Kuzmina et al., 2014).
Therefore, spatial diversity of institutions in Russia is natural in many respects. 
However, such natural causes notwithstanding, the actual interregional varia-
tions in institutional environment far exceed what can be expected from a single 
FRXQWU\ZLWKDFHQWUDOL]HGSROLWLFDODGPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG¿VFDOV\VWHPDQGKHDYLO\
restricted, at least over the last decade, regional legislative and regulatory discre-
tion. Interregional variation of institutions in Russia shows that federal legis-
lation is not uniformly and consistently enforced across the country (Yakovlev 
and Zhuravskaya , 2013). Hence Russia-wide measures of institutional quality 
could be at best accurate on the average and remote from the actual conditions 
on the ground in a particular region. Therefore, there is a strong need to measure 
institutional performance regionally. 
The patchwork of institutional regimes emerged in Russia at the outset of 
market reforms, when a weak central government was unable to establish and 
HIIHFWLYHO\HQIRUFHWKHVDPH³UXOHVRIWKHJDPH´RQWKHHQWLUHFRXQWU\2 Region-
 2 For a more detailed discussion of the recent history of Russian regional institutions, see Polishchuk (2013), 
Syunyaev and Polishchuk (2014). 
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DOJRYHUQPHQWVWRRNIXOODGYDQWDJHRIWKHRIIHUWR³WDNHDVPXFKSRZHUDV\RX
FDQXVH´$VDUHVXOWGHSHQGLQJRQWKHVWUXFWXUHDQGFRQGLWLRQVRIUHJLRQDOHFR
nomies, consolidation and composition of local elites and other exogenous fac-
WRUV5XVVLDQUHJLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV LQ WKHVIHDWXUHGDSDQRSO\RI³OLEHUDO´
³FRQVHUYDWLYH´DQGYDULRXVK\EULGUHJLPHV
The transfer of the institution-making power to the regions was a pragmatic 
FKRLFHE\DQXQVWDEOHUHJLPHWKDWZLOOLQJO\RIÀRDGHGSDLQIXODQGSROLWLFDOO\ULVN\
UHIRUPVWR ORZHUOHYHOJRYHUQPHQWV$QRWKHUH[SHFWHGDGYDQWDJHRID³UHIRUP
IURP EHORZ´ZDV LQ DOORZLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQDO H[SHULPHQWDWLRQ LQZKLFK GLIIHUHQW
versions of regional institutions had to demonstrate their relative strengths and 
weaknesses in competition for mobile investment and the capacity to stimulate 
economic growth. It was expected that more successful regional institutions 
would spread across the country by way of emulation. This logic was based 
on the well-known concept of market-preserving federalism (Weingast, 1995), 
which opens opportunities and creates incentives for competitive selection of ef-
¿FLHQWUHJLRQDOUHJLPHV
Implementation of this idea in Russia in the 1990s did not produce the ex-
SHFWHGUHVXOWVDQGLQSDUWLFXODUGLGQRWOHDGWRWKHHOLPLQDWLRQRILQHI¿FLHQWUH-
JLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQV$OWKRXJKUHJLRQVLQGHHGDFWLYHO\³OHDUQHGIURPRQHDQRWKHU´
they more often than not were adopting dubious ideas restricting competition, 
XQGHUPLQLQJSURSHUW\ULJKWVDQGWKUHDWHQLQJ¿QDQFLDOVWDELOLW\DQGWKHXQLW\RI
the Russian market (Polishchuk, 2001). One possible cause of such outcomes 
ZDV LQVXI¿FLHQW SROLWLFDO FHQWUDOL]DWLRQZLWKRXWZKLFK HFRQRPLFGHFHQWUDOL]D-
tion failed to improve economic performance (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001). 
Further more, institutional outsourcing to the regions was attempted during 
a deep and prolonged economic recession with minimal investments in the Rus-
sian economy. Under those conditions, nation-wide efforts to improve investment 
climate in a particular region were not properly rewarded because they remained 
in the shadow of an unfavorable investment reputation of the Russian economy 
at large (Polishchuk, 2013).
One would expect that the far-reaching re-centralization of the political sys-
WHPDOVRNQRZQDVHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKH³SRZHUYHUWLFDO´ZKLFKEHJDQLQ5XVVLD
in the early 2000s should have narrowed interregional institutional disparity. In-
GHHGUDGLFDOPHDVXUHVZHUHXQGHUWDNHQWRSXWDQHQGWRWKHUHJLRQDO³SDUDGHRI
VRYHUHLJQWLHV´YLUWXDOO\HOLPLQDWLQJUHJLRQDOOHJDODQGUHJXODWRU\SUHURJDWLYHV
5XVVLDQSXEOLF¿QDQFHZDVVLPLODUO\FHQWUDOL]HG)LQDOO\HOHFWLRQVRI UHJLRQDO
governors by popular vote were cancelled (to be restored later with consider-
able restrictions and caveats), and regional chief executives were subordinated to 
the Russian president. 
$JDLQVWH[SHFWDWLRQV³SRZHUYHUWLFDO´KDVQRWKDUPRQL]HGLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHJLPHV
LQ5XVVLDQ UHJLRQV5XVVLDQ FLWLHV DQG UHJLRQV VWLOO GLIIHU VLJQL¿FDQWO\ IURPRQH
another in their business environment, even if they are otherwise comparable in 
terms of the capacity of regional markets, population, and other exogenous factors 
WKDWDIIHFWUHJLRQDOHFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQVDQGUHJLRQV¶DWWUDFWLYHQHVVIRULQYHVWPHQW
,QIDFWZHVKRZODWHULQWKHSDSHUWKDWUHJLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVXQGHU³SRZHUYHUWLFDO´ 
exhibited further divergence, rather than the expected convergence.) In part, this 
was due to the limited ability of the federal government to exercise control over 
regional administrations, even when implementing key nation-wide reforms. Thus, 
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the implementation of the national de-regulation program was delayed and highly 
XQHYHQDFURVVWKHFRXQWU\<DNRYOHYDQG=KXUDYVND\D6LJQL¿FDQWGLIIHU-
ences remained, e.g., in the pace of reforms of public administration, social ser-
vices, and market development.
The failure of the central government to effectively resolve the agency problem 
YLVjYLVUHJLRQDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQVOHIWWKHODWWHUZLWKVLJQL¿FDQWGHIDFWRDXWRQRP\
in choosing regional economic policies and ultimately regional institutions. As 
a result, regional institutions have been shaped by the incentives of regional elites. 
Cancellation of gubernatorial elections weakened direct political accountability 
of regional governments to the society, hence undermining the political mecha-
QLVPWKDWDOLJQVHOLWHV¶LQFHQWLYHVZLWKVXVWDLQDEOHUHJLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW,QVWHDG
the vertical accountability of regional governors to the central government linked 
UHJLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVWRWKHSULQFLSOHVDQGFULWHULDRIWKHDVVHVVPHQWRIJRYHUQRUV¶
performance by the federal center. 
,QWKHRU\VXFKSULQFLSOHVVKRXOGUHÀHFWWKHFRQWULEXWLRQRIUHJLRQDODXWKRULWLHV
to economic development and social welfare; in other words, to establishing and 
PDLQWDLQLQJHI¿FLHQW UHJLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV7KHUHIRUH WKHSUREOHPRIPHDVXULQJ
regional institutions took on new, purely pragmatic, administrative and political 
VLJQL¿FDQFH,WWXUQHGRXWKRZHYHUWKDWLQSUDFWLFHWKHDVVHVVPHQWRIJRYHUQRUV¶
performance posed a number of serious problems. First, governors are responsible 
for numerous tasks; hence, the results of their work are inherently multi-dimen-
VLRQDO$FFRUGLQJO\WKHRI¿FLDOFULWHULDRIJRYHUQRUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHTXLFNO\PXVK-
roomed, reaching several hundred in number. Second, even for a relatively small 
number of criteria, it is unclear how one should aggregate them with one another, 
what weights should be assigned to particular indicators, and so on. Finally, it is 
TXLWHGLI¿FXOWWRMXGJHZKHQVXFFHVVHVDQGIDLOXUHVRIUHJLRQVVKRXOGEHDWWULEXWHG
to the performance of local authorities, when to market conditions beyond regional 
JRYHUQPHQWV¶FRQWURODQGZKHQWRRWKHUH[WHUQDOIDFWRUVDQG³VKRFNV´RIUHJLRQDO
GHYHORSPHQW7KHVH GLI¿FXOWLHV QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ 5XVVLDQ JRYHUQPHQW DJHQFLHV
for a number of years have been producing various indices of regional administra-
WLRQV¶SHUIRUPDQFHPRUHRQWKDWDFWLYLW\LQWKHQH[WVHFWLRQRIWKHSDSHUZKLFK
FRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGRI¿FLDOO\HQGRUVHGPHDVXUHVRIUHJLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQV
Actual preferences of the federal center concerning the performance of region-
al governors are revealed by governor reappointment decisions. The available 
GDWD GR QRW UHYHDO DQ\ VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQL¿FDQW DVVRFLDWLRQ EHWZHHQ JRYHUQRUV¶
FRQ¿UPDWLRQLQ WKHRI¿FHIRUDQRWKHU WHUPDQGWKHVWDWHRIUHJLRQDOHFRQRPLHV
and public sectors. Instead, reappointment decisions are strongly predicted by 
the demonstrated electoral support of the ruling elites in federal and regional 
elections (Zhuravskaya, 2010; Reuter and Robertson, 2012). The desired voting 
targets were achieved by various means, and as long as ruling regional elites 
KDG VXI¿FLHQW UHVRXUFHV WR PHHW VXFK UHTXLUHPHQWV WKH\ RWKHUZLVH SUHVHUYHG
broad discretion over regional institutions. The latter can thus be considered en-
dogenous political equilibria, shaped by various factors but not pre-determined 
H[WHUQDOO\E\WKHXSSHUOHYHOJRYHUQPHQWDVRQHPLJKWH[SHFWZLWKWKH³SRZHU
YHUWLFDO´¿UPO\LQSODFH
Some of the above factors, of a geographic or historical nature, are long-run 
 determinants of regional development; otherwise, Russian regional institutions are 
outcomes of public choice involving regional elites and various interest groups, 
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which are often in symbiotic relationships with one another (Petrov and Titkov, 
2010; Syunyaev and Polishchuk, 2014). As a result, the problem of assessment 
and measurement of Russian regional institutions is as topical as ever. In the next 
section, we review the sources of data that could be used to this end. 
4. Data Sources 
Regional indices of institutional quality are produced by private rating agen-
FLHVQRQSUR¿WRUJDQL]DWLRQV LQFOXGLQJEXVLQHVVDVVRFLDWLRQVDQG WKLQN WDQNV
government agencies, and individual researchers. In this section, we review 
the most widely cited sources of data on regional institutions and the new indica-
tors developed by the authors.3 A summary of the covered institutional measures 
for Russian regions is presented in Table 1.
Russian Regional Investment Attractiveness Rating by RA Expert rating agency 
is perhaps the best-known measure of the quality of institutions in Russian re-
gions. The rating aggregates two components — investment risk and investment 
potential — and each of those combines several sub-components based on data 
collected by state statistical services and private consultancies. These data cover 
the quality of public administration, political and legal risks, and other factors. 
Weights used to aggregate sub-components are determined by annual surveys of 
experts from Russian and foreign consulting and investment companies. The RA 
Expert rating agency does not disclose its methodology in detail.
The business association of small and medium-sized enterprises “Opora Rossii ” 
composes widely known indices of entrepreneurial climate. This business asso-
FLDWLRQKDVRI¿FHVLQHYHU\5XVVLDQUHJLRQDQGLWVPHPEHUVKLSLVDSSUR[LPDWHO\
WKRXVDQGHQWHUSULVHV6LQFH³2SRUD5RVVLL´KDVEHHQDQDO\]LQJUHJLRQDO
business climates and ranks regions accordingly. Neither sampling nor methodo-
ORJLHVRIVXFKUDQNLQJVKDYHEHHQFRQVLVWHQWRYHUWKHREVHUYDWLRQSHULRG³2SRUD
5RVVLL´SXEOLVKHVUDWLQJVRIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFOLPDWHEXVLQHVVVHFXULW\FRUUXSWLRQ
DQGPHDVXUHVRI³IUHHGRPIURPLQVSHFWLRQDJHQFLHVSUHVVXUH´ ³IUHHGRPIURPODZ
HQIRUFHPHQWDJHQFLHVSUHVVXUH´DQG³IUHHGRPIURPFULPLQDOSUHVVXUH´
Lately, regional institutional measures have been regularly produced by cen-
tral government agencies; this task has acquired added importance after the can-
cellation of direct gubernatorial elections. This has been sanctioned by a presi-
dential decree that authorized a formal evaluation of the situations in Russian 
UHJLRQVDQGVSHFL¿HGVHYHUDOGR]HQLQGLFDWRUVRIWKHTXDOLW\RIUHJLRQDOJRYHU-
nance and policies, including indices of public opinion about the functioning and 
transparency of regional administrations.47KHVHGDWDDUHVWRUHGLQWKH8QL¿HG
Interdepartmental Statistical Information System (UniSIS).5 The Ministry of 
 3 Our list of institutional indicators is incomplete; in particular, it does not include outdated indices developed 
many years ago and not updated since. Moreover, as already noted, the boundary between measures of 
institutions and institutional outcomes is often blurred. Hence, we do not consider various indicators of economic 
performance and business climate in the Russian regions, which in our opinion are more on the outcomes side. 
We also skip measures of political institutions, press freedom, or the state of civil society (with the exception 
of the democracy rating produced by the Carnegie Moscow Center). A short summary of indicators of regional 
institutional quality, including sources that are not used in this article, can be found in Syunyaev and Polishchuk 
(2014). A detailed review of regional corruption indicators is presented in Libman and Kozlov (2013).
 4 7KHVHDVVHVVPHQWVDUHXVHGWRDOORFDWH¿VFDOWUDQVIHUVWRWKHEHVWSHUIRUPHUVDPRQJ5XVVLDQUHJLRQV
 5 UniSIS is a government statistical database (URL http://www.fedstat.ru/user/about.do).
165$%DUDQRYHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
Table 1
Regional institutions indices
Name Type of institution Number  
of regions
Year Data source
Investment rating 
by RA Expert rating 
agency
Investment climate 
and risks
83–89 2000–2012 RA Expert website 
http://www.raexpert.ru/ 
ratings/regions/
Opora Rossii Entrepreneurial 
climate, corruption, 
red tape, crime 
prevention 
40–80 2005, 2006, 
2008, 2011, 
2012
Opora Rossii website 
http://new.opora.ru/projects/
index
Performance 
of regional 
administrations 
Outcomes and 
transparency of 
regional governments 
83 2007–2011 UniSIS
Satisfaction of 
the population 
with regional 
administrations 
Quality and 
effectiveness of 
regional governance 
83 2007–2010 The Ministry of Regional 
Development of the Russian 
Federation
Size of the shadow 
economy
General characteristic 
of institutional quality
89 2001, 2004, 
2006–2013
Rosstat 
Corruption rankings 
by the Carnegie 
Moscow Center
Level of corruption 88 2004, 2010 Petrov and Titkov, 2013;  
http://atlas.socpol.ru/
indexes/index_democr.shtml
Democracy rating 
by the Carnegie 
Moscow Center
Political competition, 
openness and 
transparency of 
regional politics 
88 2001,  
2003–2010
Petrov and Titkov, 2013
Monitoring of 
anti-corruption 
legislation
Anti-corruption 
legislation
83 2008–2010 NISSE website 
http://www.nisse.ru/work/
projects/monitoring/ 
anti-corruption/
Regional crime 
statistics 
Business protection 
from criminal attacks, 
violent pressure on 
business 
89 2000–2010 UniSIS
9LFWLPVRIEXVLQHVV
related violence
Business security 74 1991–2010 Belokurova, 2012
Corporate raiding 
cases reported in the 
media; complaints 
about raider attacks
Property rights 
protection 
89 1999–2010 Rochlitz, 2014; 
Business Against Corruption 
website http://www.
nocorruption.biz/?cat=6
BEEPS institutional 
indices 
Red tape, the rule 
of law, business 
security, access to 
infrastructure, the 
level of corruption
37 2012 BEEPS project 
www.ebrd-beeps.com 
 Regional Development of the Russian Federation also evaluates the performance 
of regional administrations; it separately calculates measures of effectiveness and 
outcome-orientation of regional authorities. 
As noted above, the quality of formal institutions can be assessed by the size of 
the shadow economy, which provides a shelter from the excessive burdens and risks 
RIWKHRI¿FLDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQW$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\GL-
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verts resources that could other wise be used to support formal institutions and pub-
lic factors of production. The size of the shadow economy, and hence the quality of 
institutions, can be gauged by the number of those working in the informal sector. 
The Russian Statistical Service (Rosstat) annually  estimates the size of informal 
employment for every region, based on quarterly employment surveys. 
Corruption plays out prominently in measures of institutional environments in 
5XVVLDQUHJLRQV,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHDERYHPHQWLRQHGUDWLQJVE\³2SRUD5RVVLL´
one should mention the regional corruption rankings by the Carnegie Moscow 
Center (CMC) (Petrov and Titkov, 2013). These ratings are based on expert as-
sessments of the collusion between political and business elites, the effectiveness 
of anti-corruption efforts, and the frequency of corruption scandals. CMC also 
generated a democracy rating of the regionsUHÀHFWLQJH[SHUWV¶RSLQLRQVRQHJ
openness and transparency of the political life of the regions, strength of political 
opposition, and fairness of elections. 
Another index of corruption, developed by the National Institute for the System 
Studies of Entrepreneurship (NISSE), does not measure corruption per se; in-
VWHDG LW TXDQWL¿HVefforts toward prevention of corruption, such as enactment 
of regional anti-corruption legislation, existence of special agencies or bodies 
to combat corruption, and openness and transparency of anti-corruption policies 
(Saidullaev and Smirnov, 2010).
An important element of the institutional environment is business security, in-
cluding property rights protection and personal safety of business executives. 
Russian law enforcement is highly centralized, and civil and criminal law is 
WKHVDPHDFURVVWKHFRXQWU\+RZHYHUODZHQIRUFHPHQWSUDFWLFHVDQG³UXOHVRI
WKHJDPH´ IRU EXVLQHVV DFWLYLWLHV YDU\ FRQVLGHUDEO\ IURP UHJLRQ WR UHJLRQ DI-
IHFWLQJWKHULVNVRIGRLQJEXVLQHVV7RHVWLPDWHVXFKULVNVRQHFRXOGXVHRI¿FLDO
data such as the number of economic criminal cases in the region (in relation 
WRWKHQXPEHURI¿UPVRUUHJLRQDOSRSXODWLRQ,WVKRXOGEHERUQHLQPLQGWKDW
VXFKPHDVXUHVFRXOGUHÀHFWERWKWKHOHYHORIHFRQRPLFFULPHLQWKHUHJLRQDQG
the degree of violent pressure on business given that criminal law is often used in 
Russia for solving commercial disputes and for raider attacks.
Since police statistics may, for various reasons, be distorted, it is useful to sup-
plement them with information from alternative sources about attacks on business 
executives.  Belokurova (2012) presents comprehensive data on business-related 
physical attacks on businessmen, including the number of injured and murdered 
business executives. Sources of data are publications in the media, police and 
press releases, and court decisions. Another similar source is media coverage of 
raider attacks in various regions of Russia (Rochlitz, 2014). The disadvantages 
of such indicators are their possible bias due to uneven media development and 
IUHHGRPLQYDULRXVUHJLRQV)LQDOO\WKH&HQWHUIRU3XEOLF3URFHGXUHV³%XVLQHVV
$JDLQVW&RUUXSWLRQ´NHHSVUHFRUGVRIFRPSODLQWVDERXWUDLGHUDWWDFNVYLRODWLRQ
RI WKHULJKWV RI EXVLQHVVSHRSOH DQG XQMXVWL¿HG FULPLQDO FDVHV RSHQHG DJDLQVW
them (Yakovlev et al., 2014).
A useful and so far underutilized source of information for the assessment of 
institutional quality in Russian regions is the EBRD-administered Business Envi-
ronment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) project. This project con-
ducts periodic surveys of enterprises in different transition countries, including 
Russia. In the last wave, the Russian sample included 4,220 randomly selected 
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¿UPVIURPUHJLRQV7KHVDPSOHLVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHLQHDFKUHJLRQ7KH%((36
questionnaire includes dozens of questions on various aspects of enterprise activi-
ties, including, e.g., relationships with regulatory and supervisory bodies, access 
to resources and infrastructure, competition, dispute resolution, and threats to 
business. By averaging responses to such questions in a region, one can obtain 
various regional indicators of institutional quality. This approach does not suffer 
from possible distortions arising from the use of expert opinions; it describes ac-
tual conditions of regional institutions, as observed by those who confront them 
in their everyday life. Resulting institutional indicators have clear meaning and 
are derived in a transparent and reproducible manner. 
Such indicators can be divided into several categories, including administra-
tive barriers (the costs of compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, 
passing inspections, obtaining permits and licenses, and tax compliance), the rule 
of law (fairness, timeliness and effectiveness of the courts), safety of doing busi-
ness (losses due to criminal actions, costs to businesses of private security ser-
vices), access to infrastructure (connection to energy grids and telecommunica-
WLRQVQHWZRUNVDFFHVVWR¿QDQFHDQGWKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQIUHTXHQF\DQGVL]H
of bribes in dealing with various government bodies). A drawback of the BEEPS 
project as a source of data for institutional measurement is the relatively small 
number of represented regions.
5. Interplay of Institutional Indicators
To what extent are the measures of regional institutional quality described in 
the previous section related to one another? To answer this question, we examine 
the correlations between those measures. Recall that in the case of measurement 
of institutional quality at the cross-country level, tight connectedness between 
different indicators raised questions about the soundness and reliability of mea-
surement techniques and was ascribed to possible measurement errors. 
Pairwise correlations between various institutional indices for Russian regions 
DUHSUHVHQWHGLQ7DEOH,QWKHWDEOHZHVKRZRQO\VLJQVRIFRUUHODWLRQFRHI¿-
FLHQWVDQGRQO\LIWKRVHDUHVLJQL¿FDQWO\GLIIHUHQWIURP]HUR7RVLPSOLI\UHDGLQJ
the table, we assume that for all indicators, higher values correspond to higher 
institutional quality (e.g., better quality of governance, improved investment 
climate , and lower corruption or crime rates).6
Table 2 shows that the links between various institutional measures in Russian 
regions are far less pronounced and straightforward than in the case of the Gov-
ernance Matters country indicators. First, correlations of regional indices in al-
PRVW  RI DOO SRVVLEOH SDLUZLVH FRPELQDWLRQV DUH VWDWLVWLFDOO\ LQVLJQL¿FDQW
6HFRQGDPRQJVLJQL¿FDQWFRUUHODWLRQVRQO\DUHSRVLWLYHSRVLWLYHFRUUHOD-
tions should be expected if various indices agree with one another in estimat-
ing institutional quality). Negative correlations suggest either inconsistencies of 
measurement techniques, or, if the involved institutions differ from one another 
in their role and purpose, possible substitution between such institutions. 
 6 7KH¿UVW HLJKW LQGLFDWRUV LQ7DEOH  DUH RUGLQDO UDQNLQJVZKHUHDV WKHUHVW DUH FDUGLQDO ,I DW OHDVW RQH
indicator in a correlation is ordinal, we report Spearman correlations and conventional Pearson correlations 
otherwise. 
168
$%DUDQRYHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRP
LFVí

Table 2 
Pairwise correlations of institutional quality measures.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
Effectiveness of executive branch (MRD)
Performance of executive branch (MRD) +***
Overall assessment of executive branch (MRD) +* +*
Overall effectiveness (MRD) +*** +*** +***
Investment risk (RA Expert) í**
Investment rating (RA Expert) +*** +*** í***
Investment potential (RA Expert) +** +*** +***
Corruption (Carnegie Center) +* +**
Died in business crimes (Belokurova) –*** –*** –*** –*** +**
Businessmen died in business crimes (Belokurova) –** –*** +** –*** –*** +** +***
1XPEHURIHFRQRPLFFULPLQDOFDVHVSHU¿UP
(UniSIS)
+*** +* í** í*
Number of appeals to Business against Corruption 
per economic crime (BAC)
+* –* –* +* +*** +***
Share of employed in informal sector (Rosstat) í* –* +*** +* –* +*
Anti-corruption legislation (NISIPP) +*
Satisfaction with executive branch performance 
(UniSIS)
+** +*** +*** í* +*** +** +*
Freedom from bureaucratic pressure (OPORA) +* +***
Freedom from criminal pressure (OPORA) +* +*** +** +***
Satisfaction with transparency of executive branch 
(UniSIS)
+*** +** í*** +** +** +** +** +** +***
Democratic rating (Carnegie Center) í* +* +*** +** í* í**
Raider attacks reported in media (Rochlitz) +** –*** –*** +*** +*** í** +*** +*** +* –*
Notes: (1) Effectiveness of executive branch (MRD); (2) Performance of executive branch (MRD); (3) Overall assessment of executive branch (MRD); (4) Overall effectiveness (MRD); (5) Investment 
risk (RA Expert); (6) Investment Rating (RA Expert); (7) Investment potential (RA Expert); (8) Corruption (Carnegie Center); (9) Died in business crimes (Belokurova); (10) Businessmen died in 
business crimes (Belokurova); (11)1XPEHURIHFRQRPLFFULPLQDOFDVHVSHU¿UP8QL6,6(12) Number of appeals to business against corruption per economic criminal cases (BAC); (13) Share 
of employed in informal sector of economy (Rosstat); (14) Anti-corruption legislation (NISIPP); (15) Satisfaction with executive branch performance (UniSIS); (16) Freedom from bureaucratic 
pressure (OPORA); (17) Freedom from criminal pressure (OPORA); (18) Satisfaction with transparency of executive branch (UniSIS); (19) Raider attacks reported in media (Rochlitz).
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Three indicators of executive branch performance included in our analysis are 
positively associated with one another, which is probably due to similar methods 
used by the same government agency — the Ministry of Regional Development 
(MRD) — to derive those measures, and due to their semantic proximity with 
HDFKRWKHU7KHDERYHLQGLFDWRUVDUHDOVRVLJQL¿FDQWO\FRUUHODWHGZLWK5$([SHUW
investment rating with the expected sign. Surprisingly, the risks of doing busi-
QHVV DVPHDVXUHGE\ FULPH UDWHV *%HORNXURYD¶V GDWD DUH KLJKHU LQ UHJLRQV
where MRD deems regional administrations more effective and that have higher 
investment ratings and potential.7 Perhaps this is an indication that economic 
FULPHVIROORZHEEVDQGÀRZVRIHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\$WWKHVDPHWLPHORZHUOHY-
els of corruption (measured by the Carnegie Canter) are, as expected, associated 
with lower crime rates.
:HDOVR¿QGWKDWFRUUXSWLRQPHDVXUHGE\WKH&DUQHJLH&HQWHULVORZHULQUH-
gions with larger shares of the informal sector in the regional economy. A pos-
sible explanation is that corruption occurs largely in the formal sector, or, in other 
words, that the informal economy provides a shelter against corruption. Existence 
of anti-corruption legislation in a region is weakly correlated with the actual levels 
RIFRUUXSWLRQDQGRWKHULQGLFDWRUVRILQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\7KHODVW¿QGLQJDJUHHV
with earlier studies, concluding, based on cross-country comparisons, that formal 
institutions themselves do not necessarily generate the expected outcomes. 
Another measure of regional institutional quality is the UniSIS index of satis-
IDFWLRQZLWKUHJLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWV¶SHUIRUPDQFH7KLVPHDVXUHLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK
analogous indicators produced by MRD and is, furthermore, positively corre-
lated with absence of corruption.  Additionally, according to UniSIS data, trans-
parency of regional administrations is an important factor of institutional quality 
EHFDXVHLWLVSRVLWLYHO\FRUUHODWHGZLWKPRVWRIWKHRI¿FLDOPHDVXUHVRIUHJLRQDO
JRYHUQDQFHDQGHFRQRPLFVHFXULW\LQGLFHV)LQDOO\&DUQHJLH&HQWHU¶VGHPRFUDF\
rating is weakly correlated with most indicators except the corruption index pro-
duced by the same agency.
,QJHQHUDOLWLVKDUGWR¿QGDQ\FRQVLVWHQWSDWWHUQVLQWKHSDWFKZRUNRIOLQNVRU
lack thereof between institutional quality indicators across Russian regions. On 
DSRVLWLYHQRWHUHJLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOPHDVXUHVGRQRWIHDWXUHWKH³QHDUXQDQLP-
LW\´REVHUYHGIRUVRPHQDWLRQDOLQGLFDWRUVRILQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\UHFDOOWKDWVXFK
³FRQVHQVXV´EHWZHHQYDULRXVPHDVXUHVUDLVHGGRXEWVDERXWWKHLUDSSOLFDELOLW\LQ
applied institutional studies. Conversely, many indices of Russian regional insti-
tutions are produced in a non-transparent manner, and their derivation cannot be 
LQGHSHQGHQWO\UHSURGXFHGDQGYHUL¿HG7KHUHIRUHLWLVGLI¿FXOWWRVD\WRZKDWH[-
WHQWWKH³GLVDJUHHPHQW´EHWZHHQVXFKLQGLFHVUHÀHFWVDFWXDOPXOWLGLPHQVLRQDOLW\
of regional institutions and to what extent it is an artifact of ad hoc approaches to 
institutional measurement and the subjectivity of expert judgments. 
It could also be problematic to compress the multidimensional bundle of mea-
sures into a smaller number of aggregate indices by factor analysis because fac-
WRUV WKXVREWDLQHGFRXOGUHÀHFWQRWQHFHVVDULO\REMHFWLYHOLQNVEHWZHHQLQVWLWX-
 7 Note that measures based on the data collected by G. Belokurova largely agree with similar measures 
produced from the dataset independently collected by M. Rochlitz; such agreement lends credibility to both 
PHDVXUHV7KLVLVLQVRPHFRQWUDGLFWLRQZLWKWKH2325$¶VGDWDVXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHH[HFXWLYH
EUDQFK¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLVSRVLWLYHO\FRUUHODWHGZLWKIUHHGRPIURPFULPLQDOSUHVVXUHRQEXVLQHVV
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tions and their measures but instead, e.g., commonality of measurement tech-
niques. In such a case, interpretation of aggregate factors is hardly possible. 
In what follows, we use an alternative approach to discerning a structure in 
UHJLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVEDVHGRQWKH%((36GDWDVHWVXUYH\RI5XVVLDQ¿UPV
and on a common methodology of measuring institutions by aggregating opini ons 
expressed by businesspeople about various aspects of their institutional environ-
ment. Some of the resulting indices characterize various aspects of the same 
³FOXVWHU´RIFORVHO\UHODWHGLQVWLWXWLRQVLQZKLFKFDVHWKH\FDQEHZLWKJUHDWHU
FRQ¿GHQFHDJJUHJDWHGZLWKLQVXFKDFOXVWHULQDVLQJOHLQWHJUDOLQGH[+RZHYHU
by using BEEPS data, we restrict our analysis to the 37 regions that were covered 
by the project, thus reducing the sample size of regions by more than half.
Among the indicators of institutions from BEEPS, calculated as regional averag-
es of responses to particular questions, we single out two clusters of indices that we 
FDOOKHUHDIWHU³LQVWLWXWLRQVUXOHV´DQG³LQVWLWXWLRQVVHUYLFHV´%RWKRIWKHVHFOXVWHUV
characterize business environment, and as such can be considered institutions. In-
stitutions-services are public factors of production, such as access to infrastructure 
HOHFWULFLW\DQGWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVVHFXULW\DQGDFFHVVWR¿QDQFH:HPHDVXUH
DFFHVVWR¿QDQFHE\XVLQJVXUYH\UHVSRQVHVWRDGLUHFWTXHVWLRQIURPWKH%((36
survey, whereas in the case of access to infrastructure and security, we aggregate re-
sponses to several related questions by using a structural equation model8 (Table 3).
We also construct three indices of institutions-rules, two of which character-
ize different types of institutional pathologies, whereas the third one measures 
WKHUXOHRIODZLQDUHJLRQ,QWKHFDVHRIWKH¿UVWSDWKRORJ\WKHUHLVQR³VWURQJ
KDQG´LQDUHJLRQWKDWHIIHFWLYHO\FRQWUROVWKHUHJLRQDOHFRQRP\DQGEXUHDXFUDF\
This could be a sign of a split between various groups of economic and politi-
cal elites, in which case the regional bureaucracy is not constrained by either 
 8 See, e.g., Reiss and Wolak (2007) for an overview of this aggregation methodology. Similar techniques are 
used on several other occasions later in the paper. 
Table 3 
Factor loadings of aggregated indices.
Institutional 
type 1
Institutional 
type 2
Rule  
of law
Access 
to infra -
structure
Security
)UHTXHQF\RIEULELQJRI¿FLDOV 0.776
Frequency of bribery at customs 0.810
Frequency of bribery related to courts 0.818
Frequency of bribery related to tax administration 0.811
Taxation as a barrier to business 0.404
Licensing and permits as a barrier to business 0.251
Average kickbacks in public procurement 0.536
$YHUDJHVL]HRIEULEHVSDLGWRJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOV 0.536
Fairness of court system 0.673
(I¿FLHQF\RIFRXUWV\VWHP 0.697
Enforcement of court decisions 0.633
'LI¿FXOWLHVLQDFFHVVLQJHOHFWULFLW\ 0.664
'LI¿FXOWLHVLQDFFHVVLQJWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV 0.664
Absence of security costs 0.432
Absence of losses from crimes 0.540
Crimes and disorder as a barrier to business 0.542
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democratic or administrative accountability, leading to decentralized and unco-
RUGLQDWHGFRUUXSWLRQZLWKIUHTXHQWEULEHU\RIPXOWLSOHEXUHDXFUDWV$ÀLSVLGHRI
uncoordinated corruption is excessive red tape. A measure of such an institutional 
SDWWHUQRI³DGPLQLVWUDWLYHFKDRV´KHUHDIWHU7\SHLVFRQVWUXFWHGE\DJJUHJDWLQJ
responses to BEEPS questions about frequency of bribery and tax administration/
bureaucratic burden (see Table 3).
$QDOWHUQDWLYH WR³DGPLQLVWUDWLYHFKDRV´LV³DGPLQLVWUDWLYHRUGHU´KHUHDIWHU
7\SHZKLFKLVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\D¿UPJULSRQSRZHUE\WKHUHJLRQDOJRYHUQRU
6XFKUHJLPHVXVXDOO\LQYROYHFHQWUDOL]HGFRUUXSWLRQRUJDQL]HGRQD³RQHVWRS
VKRS´ EDVLVZKHUHE\ D ODUJH RQHRII SD\PHQW VHFXUHV DQ LQIRUPDO ³OLFHQVH WR
RSHUDWH´ZKLFKSURWHFWVIURPSHWW\XQFRRUGLQDWHGDQGXQDXWKRUL]HGEULEHU\E\
lower-level bureaucrats. A measure of Type 2 aggregates answers to the survey 
questions about size of bribes and kickbacks in public procurement. Finally, to 
measure the rule of law in a region, we aggregate responses to questions about 
IDLUQHVVDQGHI¿FLHQF\RIWKHFRXUWV\VWHPDQGHQIRUFHPHQWRIFRXUWGHFLVLRQV
It is well known that centralized corruption is less burdensome and damag-
LQJ IRU WKHSULYDWH VHFWRU WKDQ GHFHQWUDOL]HG FRUUXSWLRQ EHLQJ ³WKHOHVVHU RI
WZRHYLOV´6KOHLIHUDQG9LVKQ\1XPHURXVDQGXQFRRUGLQDWHGH[WRUWLRQV
UHSURGXFHWKH³WUDJHG\RIWKHFRPPRQV´WXUQLQJWKHUHJLRQDOHFRQRP\LQWRDQ
open-access resource for uncontrollable lower level bureaucracy. BEEPS data 
show that another advantage of Type 2 over Type 1 is higher quality and avail-
ability of institutions-services. 
Indeed, according to Table 4, all three types of institutions-services are positively 
DQGKLJKO\VLJQL¿FDQWO\FRUUHODWHGZLWKRQHDQRWKHUPDNLQJLWSRVVLEOH WRUDQN
regions according to technical conditions of doing business. At the same time, 
LQVWLWXWLRQDO7\SHLVVLJQL¿FDQWO\FRUUHODWHGZLWKDOOWKUHHLQVWLWXWLRQVVHUYLFHV
ZKHUHDV7\SHLVVLJQL¿FDQWO\FRUUHODWHGRQO\ZLWKDFFHVVWR¿QDQFH9 Therefore, 
UHJLRQVRI³DGPLQLVWUDWLYHRUGHU´RIIHUEHWWHUFRQGLWLRQVIRUGRLQJEXVLQHVVWKDQ
UHJLRQVRI³DGPLQLVWUDWLYHFKDRV´GRGXHWROHVVUHGWDSHJUHDWHUDYDLODELOLW\RI
public production inputs and services, and a lower total burden of corruption. Such 
advantages agree with the view that non-democratic regimes with a strong grip on 
SRZHUKDYH³HQFRPSDVVLQJ´LQWHUHVWVLQHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWDQGKHQFHVWURQ-
ger incentives to supply public production inputs (Olson, 1993). 
 9 1RWHWKDWUHJLRQDO¿QDQFLDOV\VWHPVDUHLQWHJUDWHGLQWRWKHQDWLRQDORQHDQGWKXVGHSHQGRQDQGDUHDIIHFWHG
by regional governments much less than are infrastructure and security, which are largely localized within 
a region.
Table 4 
Pairwise correlations of aggregate indices.
Institutional 
type 1
Institutional 
type 2
Rule  
of law
Access to 
infra structure
Security
Institutional type 2 +***
Rule of law
Access to infrastructure +***
Security +*** +***
$FFHVVWR¿QDQFH +*** +*** +*** +***
Notes: SRVLWLYHFRUUHODWLRQ íQHJDWLYHFRUUHODWLRQ***VLJQL¿FDQFH OHYHO**VLJQL¿FDQFH OHYHO
*VLJQL¿FDQFHOHYHO
172 $%DUDQRYHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
Notice that neitherof the above types conforms to the conventional view of en-
abling institutions, which rule out both high- and low-level corruption, ensure ef-
¿FLHQWSURYLVLRQRISXEOLFJRRGVDQGVHUYLFHVDQGDUHEDVHGRQWKHUXOHRIODZ,W
is symptomatic that the rule of law in Russian regions is orthogonal (both literally 
DQGPHWDSKRULFDOO\WRERWKLQVWLWXWLRQDOW\SHVDQGLQDGGLWLRQLVQRWVLJQL¿FDQWO\
related to any of the above-described institutions-services. 
Most pairwise correlations of the two institutional types with other indices are 
XVXDOO\VWDWLVWLFDOO\LQVLJQL¿FDQW7KLVFRXOGEHGXHWRGLIIHUHQFHVLQPHWKRGROR-
gies, lower number of regions for which BEEPS-originated measures could be 
calculated, and, last but not least important, could be an indication that the Rus-
sian institutional palette is essentially multi-dimensional and cannot be adequate-
ly described by only a few indicators. It is noteworthy, however, that institutional 
Type 1 is negatively correlated with the assessment of regional administrations 
E\0LQ5HJLRQDQGWKHFRUUHODWLRQLVKLJKO\VLJQL¿FDQW,QFRQWUDVW0LQ5HJLRQ¶V
DVVHVVPHQWV DUH QHXWUDO WR7\SH  WKHUH LV QR VLJQL¿FDQW FRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ
WKHWZR(YLGHQWO\WKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWGLVOLNHV³DGPLQLVWUDWLYHFKDRV´DQG
FHWHULVSDULEXVJLYHVSUHIHUHQFHWRWKH³DGPLQLVWUDWLYHRUGHU´GHVSLWHWKHODUJH
scale centralized corruption that could be present in such regimes. 
6. Dynamics of Regional Institutions
Apart from institutional differences across regions, changes of institutional 
quality over time are also of considerable interest. Institutional indicators that are 
available both across regions and for different periods in time could be used to 
study institutions along both spatial and temporal dimensions, shedding light on 
a number of additional questions. Is it true that institutional trends for particular 
regions follow such trends for the country at large, or deviate from those? Is it 
possible to improve institutions in a region against the backdrop of institutions 
deteriorating nationally? Is there any rotation among regions holding top and 
bottom positions in institutional rankings? Finally, is there evidence of conver-
gence of regional institutions, or are deep variations between regional institu-
tional regimes preserved, perhaps even growing deeper? 
:HGRQRWKDYHVXI¿FLHQWGDWDWRIXOO\DGGUHVVDOORIWKHDERYHTXHVWLRQV0RVW
of the available measures of regional institutions exist only for one period, or if 
they are available for several periods, those are years far apart from one another. 
Furthermore, various indices cover non-identical sets of regions. Nevertheless, 
WKRVHLQGLFDWRUVWKDWZHUHSURGXFHGUHSHDWHGO\RYHUWLPHDQGIRUDVXI¿FLHQWO\
large number of regions allow us to gain at least an approximate picture of insti-
tutional dynamics in Russian regions. 
The most regular source of data on regional institutional quality in Russia 
is the investment climate rating of Russian regions, which is annually updated 
E\WKHUDWLQJDJHQF\³5$([SHUW´8QIRUWXQDWHO\ WKLV LQGLFDWRUSURYLGHVRQO\
relative (ordinal) ranking of the investment attractiveness of Russian regions, 
and thus is not suitable to gauge absolute changes of institutional quality in 
a given region. However, the ratings show how often regions change their po-
sitions with respect to one another, and therefore shed light on how stable (or 
ÀXLGLVWKHFURVVUHJLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOSUR¿OH7RWKLVHQGZHXVH6SHDUPDQ
FRUUHODWLRQV EHWZHHQ WKH³5$ ([SHUW´ UDQNLQJV IRU GLIIHUHQW \HDUV 7DEOH 
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7KHFORVHUVXFKFRHI¿FLHQWVDUHWRWKHOHVV5XVVLD¶VUHJLRQVFKDQJHWKHLUUHO-
DWLYHSRVLWLRQV LQ WKHUDQNLQJ:H¿QG WKDW WKHFRUUHODWLRQ FRHI¿FLHQWV IRU UH-
gional rankings can actually fall as much as to 50%–60% for selected years, 
UHYHDOLQJVLJQL¿FDQWFKDQJHVLQUHJLRQV¶SRVLWLRQVYLVDYLVRQHDQRWKHULQWHUPV
of institutional quality. 
Another approach to evaluating regional institutional dynamics is to exam-
ine the number of people employed in the informal sector. As indicated above, 
WKHVL]H RI WKHLQIRUPDO VHFWRU FDQ VHUYH DV D ³OLWPXV WHVW³ ZLWK WKHRSSRVLWH
sign) for the quality of institutions in the formal sector. Data on informal sector 
employment has been regularly collected for all Russian regions for a number 
RI\HDUVDQGLQFRQWUDVWWRWKHUDQNLQJVSURGXFHGE\³5$([SHUW´WKHVL]HRI
the informal sector is not a subjective and ordinal measure of institutional qual-
ity but an objective and cardinal one. As before, we examine the correlation 
FRHI¿FLHQWV WKLV WLPH FRQYHQWLRQDO 3HDUVRQ FRUUHODWLRQV RI WKLVPHDVXUH IRU
GLIIHUHQW\HDUVWRDVVHVVWKHFKDQJHVLQLQWHUUHJLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOSUR¿OHVRYHU
time (Table 6). 
Table 5 
&RUUHODWLRQ&RHI¿FLHQWVIRU³5$([SHUW´UDWLQJRYHUWLPH
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1998 1 0.80 0.64 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.56 0.57 0.63 0.66 0.52 0.61 0.54 0.64 0.71 0.71
1999 1 0.73 0.70 0.66 0.68 0.60 0.57 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.62 0.46 0.66 0.71 0.72
2000 1 0.78 0.72 0.72 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.47 0.46 0.60 0.45 0.50 0.56 0.59
2001 1 0.77 0.80 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.53 0.49 0.54 0.45 0.54 0.58 0.61
2002 1 0.86 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.50 0.47 0.54 0.39 0.51 0.63 0.59
2003 1 0.65 0.68 0.66 0.62 0.54 0.61 0.50 0.57 0.62 0.64
2004 1 0.84 0.75 0.65 0.70 0.64 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.65
2005 1 0.81 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.70
2006 1 0.70 0.65 0.66 0.59 0.67 0.62 0.66
2007 1 0.73 0.77 0.58 0.78 0.72 0.73
2008 1 0.80 0.77 0.72 0.67 0.76
2009 1 0.71 0.66 0.71 0.74
2010 1 0.62 0.63 0.73
2011 1 0.82 0.84
2012 1 0.93
2013 1
Note: DOOFRUUHODWLRQVDUHVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWDWWKHOHYHO
Table 6 
Correlations of informal sector employment in the regions for various years.
2001 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2001 1 0.83 0.80 0.74 0.68 0.67 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.71
2004 1 0.88 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.68
2006 1 0.93 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.82 0.82
2007 1 0.89 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.79
2008 1 0.91 0.87 0.85 0.88 0.85
2009 1 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.87
2010 1 0.91 0.92 0.90
2011 1 0.96 0.87
2012 1 0.93
2013 1
Note: DOOFRUUHODWLRQVDUHVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWDWWKHOHYHO
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+HUH WRRZHVHH VLJQL¿FDQWFKDQJHV LQ UHJLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQVPHDVXUHGE\
WKHOHYHORILQIRUPDOHPSOR\PHQWZLWKFRUUHODWLRQFRHI¿FLHQWVGHFUHDVLQJE\
DQGPRUHIRUVHOHFWHG\HDUV7KLVLV\HWDQRWKHUFRQ¿UPDWLRQRIVLJQL¿FDQW
LQVWLWXWLRQDO ÀXLGLW\ LQ 5XVVLDQ UHJLRQV VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW UHJLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV
are affected not only by national institutional trends but also by various local 
factors.
Finally, a range of proxies for property rights security in Russian regions can 
be used to illustrate changes in regional institutional regimes. Such proxies make 
XVHRIFULPHGDWDSXEOLVKHGE\WKH)HGHUDO6WDWH6WDWLVWLFV6HUYLFHRUVSHFL¿FGDWD-
bases tracing assaults on busines s people (Matveeva, 2007; Belokurova, 2014) and 
UDLGLQJDWWDFNVDJDLQVW¿UPVLQDJLYHQUHJLRQ5RFKOLW]
Table 7 lists regions with the highest levels of violent pressure on business for 
various years, measured by the number of fraud cases, raiding attacks and physi-
cal assaults on businesspeople.10$FFRUGLQJ WR WKHWDEOH EHWZHHQ WKH¿UVW DQG
second half of the 2000s, the groups of regions with the greatest danger of doing 
business (variously measured) have changed their compositions by more than 
7KLVLVD\HWDQRWKHUHYLGHQFHRIVLJQL¿FDQWLQVWDELOLW\LQ5XVVLDQUHJLRQDO
LQVWLWXWLRQV9LHZHGSRVLWLYHO\EDGO\SHUIRUPLQJUHJLRQVFDQSXOOWKHPVHOYHVRXW
 10 Fraud cases and attacks against businessmen are normalized on a per capita basis, whereas raiding attacks 
DUHPHDVXUHGLQUHODWLRQWRWKHQXPEHURI¿UPVLQDUHJLRQ5HJLRQVDUHOLVWHGLQGHVFHQGLQJRUGHURIWKHDERYH
measures.
Table 7 
Regions with the highest levels of violent pressure on business. 
Fraud Cases 5DLGHUDWWDFNVDJDLQVW¿UPV Attacks against businessmen
1998–2003 2004–2010 1998–2003 2004–2010 1998–2003 2004–2010
Magadan  
Oblast
Novosibirsk  
Oblast
Chuvashia 
Republic
Ulyanovsk  
Oblast
Sakhalin  
Oblast
Adygeya 
Republic
Komi Republic Oryol  
Oblast
Sverdlovsk  
Oblast
Perm  
Krai
Moscow (City) Primorsky 
Krai
Khanty-
Mansiysk AO
Magadan  
Oblast
Tatarstan 
Republic
9RURQH]K 
Oblast
Astrakhan  
Oblast
Astrakhan  
Oblast
Kamchatka 
Krai
Stavropol  
Krai
Marij El 
Republic
Primorsky 
Krai
Primorsky 
Krai
Moscow 
(City)
Kabardino-
Balkaria
Smolensk  
Oblast
Tyumen  
Oblast
Sverdlovsk  
Oblast
Novgorod  
Oblast
Kaliningrad  
Oblast
Chukotka 
AO
9RORJGD 
Oblast
Kemerovo  
Oblast
Tver  
Oblast
Samara  
Oblast
Orenburg  
Oblast
Yamalo-Nenets 
AO
Tatarstan 
Republic
Penza  
Oblast
9ROJRJUDG 
Oblast
Khabarovsk 
Krai
Moscow  
Oblast
9ROJRJUDG 
Oblast
Bashkortostan 
Republic
9ROJRJUDG 
Oblast
St. Petersburg 
(City)
St. Petersburg 
(City)
Zabaykalsky 
Krai
Kursk  
Oblast
Tomsk  
Oblast
Tver  
Oblast
Saratov  
Oblast
Smolensk  
Oblast
Kamchatka 
Krai
Tyumen  
Oblast
Tuva 
Republic
Chelyabinsk  
Oblast
Chelyabinsk  
Oblast
Moscow  
Oblast
Khabarovsk 
Krai
9RORJGD 
Oblast
Perm  
Krai
Arkhangelsk  
Oblast
North Ossetia-
Alania
Kemerovo  
Oblast
Samara  
Oblast
Kaluga  
Oblast
Astrakhan  
Oblast
9ODGLPLU 
Oblast
Murmansk  
Oblast
Mordovia 
Republic
Novgorod  
Oblast
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RIWKHGDQJHURXV]RQHRIVLJQL¿FDQWULVNVRISK\VLFDOYLROHQFHDQGSURSHUW\ULJKWV
violations for local business communities. However, read differently, this table 
suggests that in a relatively short period, a safer region could slip to the bottom 
of the ranking. Such instability can be a powerful deterrent for investments and 
private enterprise. 
During the last two decades, the overall quality of institutions in Russia re-
PDLQHGORZDQGHYHQFRQWLQXHGWRGHFOLQHDVHYLGHQFHGHJE\WKH³*RYHUQDQFH
0DWWHUV´ LQGLFHV PRGH GHWDLOV FDQ EH IRXQG LQ 3ROLVKFKXN $OWKRXJK
a slight improvement was recorded for a number of institutional measures in 
the early 2000s, it proved to be short-lived. The above indices of criminal pres-
sure on business also demonstrate a lack of clear-cut and sustainable tendency 
toward institutional strengthening in the country (Fig. 1). 
Although our results indicate that institutions in Russian regions evolve in 
different directions, one should still expect that regional indicators of econom-
ic, legal and political institutions broadly follow overall Russian trends — if 
for no other reason than because national indices are aggregates of regional 
ones. Furthermore, as was already noted, a negative image of national institu-
tions suppresses incentives to improve regional ones. Although it is indeed true 
that in most regions, institutions follow Russia-wide trajectories in accordance 
ZLWKVXFKH[SHFWDWLRQVWKH\VLJQL¿FDQWO\GHYLDWHIURPQDWLRQDOWUHQGVLQVRPH
instances. 
According to Fig. 2, the number of raider attacks in Russia peaked in the mid-
2000s. Regions with a large share of heavy industries (e.g., Sverdlovsk oblast 
and Tatarstan) suffered from multiple raider attacks in the late 1990s and early 
V2QFH WKH¿JKW IRU UHGLVWULEXWLRQ RI LQGXVWULDO DVVHWV FDPH WR DQ HQG LQ
these regions, the property rights situation became more stable. In Moscow, cor-
porate raiding attacks had a slower start and reached a peak, as in Russia at large, 
in the mid-2000s. Some other regions, such as Primorsky krai, experienced an 
increase in raiding attacks only toward the end of the decade, possibly due to 
massive investments in large-scale infrastructure projects.
Fig. 1. Dynamics of violent pressure on business in Russia.
Note:9LFWLPV²WKH QXPEHU RI NLOOHG RU LQMXUHG EXVLQHVVPHQ LQ5XVVLD SHU \HDU DV GRFXPHQWHG E\PHGLD
sources (Belokurova 2014); Raids — number of companies attacked by corporate raiders per year in Russia 
as documented by media sources (Rochlitz 2014); Cases — the number of property related crimes per year in 
5XVVLDIURPRI¿FLDOSROLFHVWDWLVWLFV7RSUHVHQWDOOWKUHHFXUYHVRQDVLQJOHJUDSKWKHQXPEHUVRIUDLGVKDYH
been multiplied by 10, and property-related crimes documented by police have been divided by 100.
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The interrelationship between national and regional trends can also be ex-
plored by using regional informal employment data. For Russia at large, 
the share of informal employment increased from 16.4% in 2000 to 21.8% 
LQDJDLQUHÀHFWLQJDGHFOLQHLQRYHUDOOLQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\'XULQJWKDW
 period, the share of informal employment increased in 63 regions (particularly 
in the North Caucasus and some regions in central Russia and Siberia), whereas 
in 17 regions, the share of informal employment actually decreased. However, 
LQQRQHRIWKHVHUHJLRQVZDVWKHREVHUYHGGHFUHDVHVLJQL¿FDQWRUVXVWDLQDEOH
(Fig. 3).
It is usually assumed that the informal sector grows in response to increasing 
pressure on businesses operating in the formal sector. Although there is some 
UHÀHFWLRQRIVXFKDQHIIHFWLQRXUGDWDLWLVQRWVXI¿FLHQWO\UREXVWDQGRFFDVLRQ-
DOO\RSSRVLWHWHQGHQFLHVWUDQVSLUH$FFRUGLQJWR7DEOHWKHFRUUHODWLRQFRHI¿-
cients between various measures of violent pressure on business and the share of 
informal employment in Russian regions, calculated for the years between 2000 
DQGDUHRIWHQVPDOODQGVXEMHFWWRVLJQL¿FDQWFKDQJHRYHUWLPH7KHOLQN
between informal employment and violence against entrepreneurs is more 
clearly pronounced, although this link, too, becomes weaker toward the end of 
Fig. 2. Raider attacks on businesses for Russia and selected Russian regions.
Note: Russia — number of raider attacks per year; regions (Sverdlovsk Oblast, Tatarstan, Primorsky krai, 
0RVFRZ²QXPEHURIUDLGHUDWWDFNVSHU\HDUGLYLGHGE\WKHQXPEHURI¿UPV
Fig. 3. Employment in the informal sector in Russia and selected Russian regions  
(% of overall employment).
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the observation period.11 This is yet another indication of the complexity and 
³PXOWLGLPHQVLRQDOLW\´RI UHJLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG WKHLU KHDY\GHSHQGHQFHRQ
geographic, economic and other idiosyncratic factors. 
$VDOUHDG\PHQWLRQHG5XVVLD¶VUHJLRQVIHDWXUHSURIRXQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOKHWHURJH-
neity. It is important to know how the spatial institutional disparity evolves over 
time, and in particular, whether there is institutional convergence of Russian re-
JLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHJLPHVRUDUHWKH\GULIWLQJIXUWKHUDSDUW7KHORJLFRI³PDU-
NHWSUHVHUYLQJIHGHUDOLVP´ZRXOGVXJJHVWDFRQYHUJHQFHRIUHJLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVWR
best-practice patterns because the regions that are lagging behind their neighbors 
are forced to improve their institutions in order not to lose out in the competition 
for mobile investments and other resources. However, essential preconditions of 
WKHWKHRU\RI³PDUNHWSUHVHUYLQJIHGHUDOLVP´VXFKDVWKHHIIHFWLYHSURWHFWLRQRI
Russia-wide markets, are not met in the Russian context. Therefore, the question 
of conversion or diversion of regional institutions must be answered empirically. 
To this end, we use once again the share of informal employment to examine 
how the national average of such shares and their variances evolve over time. Ta-
ble 9 shows that against the backdrop of nationally declining institutional quality, 
UHJLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVH[KLELWVLJQL¿FDQWGLYHUJHQFH$SRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQPLJKW
be that the inadequate national institutions suppress investments in the Russian 
economy and impede the development of a national market and the integration of 
regions into a single economic space, which could have led to institutional con-
vergence across the country. Instead, what we observe is an ongoing institutional 
GLYHUJHQFHUHPLQLVFHQWRIWKH¿UVW\HDUVRIHFRQRPLFUHIRUPLQWKHHDUO\V
 11 Recall that a negative association between informal economy and violence against businesses could be an 
indication that the informal economy provides shelter from crime. 
Table 8 
Pairwise correlation between various proxies for institutional quality and the share of informal employment.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
raid / vic 0.03 0.04 0.30 0.77 0.71 0.63 0.86 0.44 0.85 0.45 0.64
raidw / vicw 0.05 –0.05 0.17 –0.01 0.01 0.08 0.02 –0.04 0.05 –0.01 0.02
159 / raid –0.05 0.06 –0.07 0.03 –0.05 0.00 –0.06 –0.05 –0.02 0.01 –0.06
159 / vic –0.02 –0.02 –0.01 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.05 –0.08 –0.15 –0.10 0.06
inf / 159 –0.12 –0.09 –0.11 –0.15 –0.22 –0.26 –0.16 –0.24 –0.23 –0.29 –0.25
inf / raid –0.16 –0.09 –0.26 –0.33 –0.35 –0.35 –0.27 –0.21 –0.18 –0.22 –0.21
inf / vic –0.51 –0.44 –0.41 –0.49 –0.42 –0.47 –0.29 0.02 –0.38 –0.32 –0.26
inf / raidw –0.10 –0.02 –0.18 –0.06 –0.12 –0.07 –0.02 –0.06 –0.04 –0.09 0.26
inf / vicw –0.22 –0.09 –0.21 –0.40 –0.26 –0.15 –0.03 0.14 –0.16 –0.08 0.09
Note: raid = number of raiding attacks per year and region; vic = numbers of businessmen injured or killed 
SHU\HDUDQGUHJLRQUDLGZ QXPEHURIUDLGLQJDWWDFNVSHU\HDUDQGUHJLRQZHLJKWHGE\WKHQXPEHURI¿UPVLQ
a region in the given year; vicw = numbers of businessmen injured or killed per year and region weighted by 
regional population; 159 = number of fraud cases per year and region weighted by regional population; inf = % 
share of the regional workforce employed in the informal sector. 
Table 9 
Mean and variance for the share of informal sector employment.
2001 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Mean 16.40 18.86 21.14 21.59 21.75 22.03 18.78 20.72 21.84 22.89
9DULDQFH 4.86 5.79 7.29 7.27 6.48 7.17 6.63 6.73 7.02 7.33
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7. Conclusion: Causes and Consequences of Institutional Divergence
Availability of clearly interpretable indices of institutional quality improves 
the odds of quantifying the roles of institutions in socio-economic development in 
Russian regions, and of identifying the root causes of the institutional heterogene-
ity across the country. Such analyses could reveal the potential for institutional 
reform in advancing regional development and long-term exogenous determinants 
of regional institutions that facilitate or impede progressive institutional change. 
In-depth discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, which is 
primarily about institutional measurement per se, rather than using institutional 
measures in applied regional studies. We will conclude with several examples 
drawn from the recent literature that illustrate how regional institutional measure-
ment expands opportunities for linking regional institutions to their causes and 
consequences. 
In a number of papers, institutional measures are used to explain interregional 
variations of economic outcomes. Thus, corruption, crime, and excessive red tape 
are shown to impede foreign direct investments in Russian regions (Kuzmina 
et al., 2014). Taking a different perspective, Menyashev and Polishchuk (2011) 
demonstrate that accountability of local administrations affects life satisfaction 
in Russian cities. 
9DULRXVLQVWLWXWLRQVFRXOGEHOLQNHGWRRQHDQRWKHULQHIIHFWLQJHFRQRPLFRXW-
comes. Thus, liberalization of a regional economy (easing licensing requirements 
and cutting the number of inspections) complements the quality of regional gov-
ernance; in regions with transparent administrations, liberalization boosts SME 
development, whereas no such effect is observed in poorly governed regions 
( Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2013). In the same vein, institutional quality, in-
cluding control of corruption, affects the economic outcomes of privatization. 
$FFRUGLQJWR'RZHUHWDOWKH³'H6RWRHIIHFW´LHHFRQRPLFEHQH¿WVRI
IRUPDOODQGRZQHUVKLSE\FRPPHUFLDO¿UPVLVFRQVLGHUDEO\ZHDNHQHGRUVLPSO\
absent in regions with weak institutions, in part because land ownership increases 
the risks of raider attacks. 
The conditions of regional institutions also affect the allocation of talent in 
the economy and ultimately the economic returns to investments in human capi-
tal. In Russian regions with strong institutions, the percentage of talented stu-
dents choosing sciences and engineering as study areas is higher in comparison to 
regions with weak institutions, in which education in law and public administra-
tion is far more popular (Natkhov and Polishchuk, 2012). 
The value of reliable institutional measures is not only in establishing and quan-
tifying links from institutions to outcomes but also in revealing historical, social and 
political causes of institutional variations between regions. Such analysis, being of 
considerable interest in and of itself, could also be useful in ruling out reverse causali-
W\EHWZHHQLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGWKHLURXWFRPHV,QVWLWXWLRQDO³URRWV´H[SRVHGZLWKWKHKHOS
of institutional quality measures could serve as instrumental variables providing con-
sistent estimators of the association between institutions and development. 
Institutional diversity is often rooted in history. Thus, Kuzmina et al. (2014) 
OLQNWKHTXDOLW\RIWRGD\¶VLQVWLWXWLRQVLQ5XVVLDQUHJLRQVWRODERUXQUHVWVLQ5XVVLD
over 100 years ago. Similarly, Dower and Markevich (2014) established a con-
nection between the recent privatization of the Russian economy and the inten-
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VLW\RIFRQÀLFWVGXULQJWKH6WRO\SLQODQGUHIRUPLQVXFKFRQQHFWLRQVUHYHDO
stable views and preferences that could have been shaped by historical events and 
continue to shape institutional outcomes in the present era. 
The quality of regional institutions and of subnational governance in Russia 
LVLQÀXHQFHGE\QRUPVDQGYDOXHVRIWKHSRSXODWLRQZKLFKLQWXUQDUHRIWHQGH-
termined by historical, geographical or other exogenous factors. Menyashev and 
Polishchuk (2011) show that the link between civic culture and local government 
accountability observed in a number of European countries holds for Russia. 
The ethnic mix of the population many decades ago could be uncorrelated with 
WRGD\¶VHWKQLFFRPSRVLWLRQEXWUHPDLQVUHOHYDQWE\VKDSLQJVXVWDLQDEOHQRUPV
DQGYDOXHVWKDWDUHVLJQL¿FDQWIRUWKHTXDOLW\RIFRQWHPSRUDU\SROLWLFDODQGHFR-
nomic institutions (Grosfeld et al., 2013). 
Finally, the quality of regional institutions, including the investment climate, 
may be affected by regional political processes, symbiotic relationships between 
SROLWLFDODQGEXVLQHVVHOLWHVDQGE\WKHSUHYDLOLQJSDWWHUQVRIWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU¶V
representation in the political domain. Thus, political competition in a region has an 
effect on the activities of business associ ations that in turn are relevant for the pro-
tection of property rights (Pyle, 2011). Protection of property rights and the invest-
ment attractiveness of regions depend on the rotation of regional governors and 
WKHLUDI¿OLDWLRQVZLWKWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU6\XQ\DHYDQG3ROLVKFKXN
The above examples do not exhaust the analytical possibilities that are opened 
up by access to reliable indicators of regional institutional quality. One can an-
ticipate that improvement in regional institutional measurement will increase 
the quantity and quality of such studies in the future.
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